Diagnosis as Topic and as Resource: Reflections on the Epistemology and Ontology of Disease in Medical Sociology by Weinberg, Darin
Diagnosis as Topic and as Resource:
Reflections on the Epistemology and
Ontology of Disease in Medical Sociology
Darin Weinberg
University of Cambridge, United Kingdom
This article notes an enduring ambivalence in medical sociology con-
cerning the epistemology and ontology of disease and shows this is
precisely an ambivalence concerning whether biomedical disease cate-
gories are best understood as topics of, or as resources for, medical soci-
ological research. The first section critically reviews the topic/resource
debate in ethnomethodology. The second section elaborates upon the
pertinence of this debate to sociological debates directly concerned
with the epistemology and ontology of disease. The article concludes
by demonstrating how framing the epistemology and ontology of dis-
ease in terms of the topics and resources of medical sociological analy-
sis serves to clarify the work of thinking sociologically about disease and
helps overcome protracted theoretical challenges that have persistently
troubled medical sociological research.
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Medical sociologists have long debated whether to be accomplices or critics—
insiders or outsiders—to the health care professions (Straus 1957). Nowhere has
this been more fundamentally addressed than in discussions of the epistemology and
ontology of disease. Since the nineteenth century mainstream biomedicine has itself
equated the ontology of disease with the anatomical and physiological pathologies of
the body that it has itself scientifically identified. By these orthodox biomedical lights,
the disease categories devised by biomedical scientists are assumed to faithfully mir-
ror the objective and mind-independent realities underlying our various subjective
experiences of sickness (cf. Jutel 2011; Rosenberg 2002). The work of biomedical
diagnosis is here understood as epistemologically insulated from the noisiness, social
biases, and equivocality that often trouble interpretation in the broader culture by a
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strict adherence to the rules of scientific method. And, precisely because diagnosis
has long been construed as a strictly value-neutral and scientific enterprise, it was
for most of the twentieth century considered generally exempt from sociological
scrutiny. The processes through which disease categories are formulated and put to
work were uncritically assumed to systematically transcend the cultural limitations
of ordinary social interaction—taking the form of universal and value-free scientific
procedures—and to that extent immune to the explanatory repertoire of sociology.
Hence, for example, when Talcott Parsons in 1951 formulated the sick role,
the doctor’s role was conceived as purely technical, informed only by her medical
scientific training and confined to the scientific diagnosis and management of disease
and/or disability. When sociologists began to study illness behavior and illness
experience, they too took for granted that the primary independent variable was the
biomedically identified disease or disability itself, albeit, of course, supplemented
by a range of social variables (cf. Conrad 1987; Mechanic 1962; Pierret 2003; Strauss
and Glaser 1975). But this relatively uncritical deference to biomedical knowledge
was not to last. Eliot Freidson (1970) was among the first to interpret medical
claims to possess an epistemologically privileged knowledge of disease as little more
than efforts to legitimate medicine’s social power. Practitioners of what Michael
Bury (1986:140) has called post-Freidsonian medical sociology—that is, symbolic
interactionists, feminists, Foucauldians, ethnomethodologists, Marxists, and other
social constructionists—have elaborated extensively upon this theme. In stark con-
trast to earlier work, this research often questions the ontological validity of medical
categories, suggesting many conditions understood as diseases or disabilities are in
fact socially manufactured primarily for sociologically rather than biomedically dis-
coverable reasons. With the advent of the influential medicalization literature, social
constructionists began providing sociological rather than biomedical explanations
for why and how it was that various conditions including bizarre behavior, homosex-
uality, alcohol and drug use, over-eating, under-eating, infertility, aging, childbirth,
child development, youthful boisterousness, sadness, stupidity, and many others
came to be defined as specifically medical problems (cf. Busfield 2017; Conrad 2007;
Conrad and Schneider 1992). Likewise, the social model of disabilities literature has
also influentially highlighted the myriad social, rather than biomedical, challenges
suffered by those with putative disabilities (cf. Oliver 1990; Shakespeare 2006).
By insisting the biomedical diagnosis of disease and disability are not innocent
of social values, interests, and influences, social constructionism radicalized the
explanatory promise of medical sociology. More fundamentally, biology—once
understood as the universal bedrock upon which the multitude of human cultures is
built—was recast as diverse forms of socially orchestrated work accomplished across
a range of historically evolving social institutions (cf. Fleck 1979; Fujimura 1992;
Haraway 1991; Mol 2002). While indisputably invigorating for many medical sociol-
ogists, these initiatives made many others decidedly uncomfortable. Critics of social
constructionism contended that although there are certainly the odd cases of medical
over-reach, surely it was absurd to suggest conditions like cancer, diabetes, or heart
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disease are “mere” social constructions (cf. Bury 1986; Shakespeare 2006; Timmer-
mans and Haas 2008; Turner 2004; Williams 2006). Social constructionists have, of
course, provided their rejoinders (cf. Atkinson 1995; Nicolson and McLaughlin 1987;
Weinberg 2014). But despite long labors at this particular coalface, the field of med-
ical sociology remains demonstratively ambivalent about how best to conceptualize
the epistemology and ontology of disease, or the relationship between the two.
I argue in what follows that this ambivalence can be considerably clarified and
reduced by adopting the ethnomethodologically informed distinction between
the topics of sociological analyses and the resources used to implement them
(Garfinkel 1960; Garfinkel and Sacks 1970; Lynch 1993; Sacks 1963; Zimmerman and
Pollner 1970). Sociological ambivalence concerning the epistemology and ontology
of disease is precisely an ambivalence concerning whether disease categories are
best understood as topics of, or as resources for, medical sociological research.
The first section critically reviews the topic/resource debate in ethnomethodology,
demonstrating its wider relevance to contemporary social theory and to the episte-
mology and ontology of disease. More specifically, it shows how this debate evolved
from an early preoccupation with purifying sociology of common sense, or members’
assumptions, to a radically empiricist attention to members’ own ontologies and
practices and then, most recently, into a more cautious and refined enquiry into the
precise relationships that obtain between our own and our research subjects’ episte-
mologies and ontologies in particular cases. The second section further elaborates
upon this connection through a more detailed discussion of sociological debates
directly focused on the epistemology and ontology of disease. The article concludes
by demonstrating how framing the epistemology and ontology of disease in terms of
the topics and resources of medical sociological analyses serves to clarify the work
of thinking sociologically about disease and helps overcome protracted theoretical
challenges that have long vexed medical sociological research.
THE TOPIC/RESOURCE DEBATE IN ETHNOMETHODOLOGY
Largely via Alfred Schutz, ethnomethodology took some of its earliest initiatives
from Edmund Husserl (cf. Heritage 1984; Lynch 1993). Husserl’s (cf. 1970:310–11)
project was to produce a “formal ontology” that grounded science in a universalistic
account of human experience by showing how the “natural attitude” inhabited by
both lay actors and scientists gives people the sense of a phenomenal world stable
enough to sustain systematic scientific theorizing. While neither Schutz nor Harold
Garfinkel embraced Husserl’s transcendental phenomenology, both did adopt his
principled and categorical distinction between the analyst’s ideal theoretical attitude
and the natural attitude of what Garfinkel would come to call “members.”1 This dis-
tinction was reflected in the contrast ethnomethodologists drew between analytic
topics and resources.
Diagnosing sociology’s relative neglect of the methods and substance of common
sense reasoning, Garfinkel ([1967] 1984:75) wrote, “The ‘rediscovery’ of common
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sense is possible perhaps because professional sociologists, like members, have had
too much to do with common sense knowledge of social structures as both a topic and
a resource for their inquiries and not enough to do with it only and exclusively as soci-
ology’s programmatic topic.” Here Garfinkel complains that sociologists have too
often tacitly incorporated members’ common sense knowledge of social structures
as resources into their own analytic methods of study, thereby rendering common
sense knowledge comparatively less available to sociological inspection only and
exclusively as sociology’s programmatic topic.2 This critical orientation to sociology’s
reliance on common sense reasoning, or what Michael Lynch (1991:84) called a “re-
medial register,” is evident in many of ethnomethodology’s earliest canonical texts.
Harvey Sacks (1963) and Aaron Cicourel (1964), for example, both argued the social
sciences were stunted by their failure to fully distinguish their own methods of rea-
soning from common sense and offered advice on how this could be avoided. In one
of the more sustained critiques of the reliance on common sense, Zimmerman and
Pollner (1970:82) wrote,
Sociology’s acceptance of the lay member’s formulation of … sociology’s top-
ical concerns … makes sociology into an eminently folk discipline deprived of
any prospect or hope of making fundamental structures of folk activity a phe-
nomenon. Insofar as the social structures are treated as a given rather than as an
accomplishment, one is subscribing to a lay inquirer’s version of those structures.
These early texts traded on the empirically demonstrable claim that by relying
on common sense assumptions as resources, mainstream sociologists had failed to
live up to their own aspirations to produce theories bearing a historically and cultur-
ally invariant correspondence with social reality. While forthright in their claims that
their mainstream colleagues had failed to live up to their own self-imposed standards
of literality and universality, early ethnomethodologists were usually more circum-
spect as to whether they themselves aspired to fulfill such standards or whether such
standards could be fulfilled even in principle. Nonetheless, the professional pressures
to interest their mainstream colleagues in phenomenologically inspired research no
doubt encouraged use of the remedial register (Lynch 1991:84). By adopting this
register, Garfinkel, Sacks, Cicourel, and Zimmerman and Pollner at the very least
implied ethnomethodology might help sociologists approach such a theoretical liter-
ality and universality by unearthing and eliminating unexamined “folk” assumptions
from their research.
As will be discussed in further detail below, a remedial register is also explicit
in Pierre Bourdieu’s more recently formulated sociology of science when he asks:
“How is it possible for a historical activity, such as scientific activity, to produce
trans-historical truths, independent of history, detached from all bonds with both
place and time and therefore eternally and universally valid?” (Bourdieu 2004:1).
Similar to early ethnomethodology, Bourdieu’s answer was that by orchestrating
a thorough “epistemological break” with common sense and other forms of taken
for granted knowledge, social scientists can systematically incentivize and empower
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those among themselves with the greatest capacity to identify the unexamined habit-
ual assumptions corrupting their own and one another’s research. This then “leaves
less and less room for the unthought assumptions of doxa” (Bourdieu 1975:33). It
is, then, for Bourdieu, reflexive scientific competition that dissolves the naïve objec-
tivism of the unreflexive scientist and progressively eliminates all culturally relative
assumptions. As Lynch (2000:31) highlights, though, by categorically exalting his
own brand of reflexive sociology above all other forms of knowledge, Bourdieu’s
formulation “can lead to conflict when applied to practices that do not regard
themselves as naïve.” As will be shown, such conflict has become a, perhaps the,
main sticking point for those of us committed to overcoming the antinomy between
sociological and biomedical epistemologies and ontologies of disease.
Most ethnomethodologists themselves eventually abandoned the remedial regis-
ter (cf. Garfinkel and Sacks 1970). With the later Wittgenstein they accepted that
the effort to exhaustively specify one’s “unthought assumptions” cannot yield Bour-
dieu’s “eternally and universally valid” truths, but results only in infinite regress. The
difficulty is that this effort is itself inevitably informed by its own unthought habitual
assumptions which then require a further meta-reflexive turn which is also informed
by new unthought assumptions ad infinitum. Instead of seeking to cleanse sociology
of common sense resources, most ethnomethodologists have sought, seemingly more
modestly, to analyze as topics the manifest anatomy of the collective reasoning prac-
tices observable across various domains of social life (including biomedicine). This
effort, then, is less focused on purifying and thereby privileging the distinctive epis-
temologies and ontologies of sociological or ethnomethodological science than on
faithfully rendering the epistemologies and ontologies collectively accomplished in
practice by research subjects themselves.
While on its face this initiative appears opposed to the goal of exalting one’s own
epistemological privilege, closer examination reveals among some of ethnomethod-
ology’s more prominent practitioners what seems to be a radically empiricist effort
to do just that (Pollner 1991:373–74). Whereas early admonitions to avoid confusing
topics with resources encouraged efforts to epistemologically purify and exalt soci-
ological theory, more recent research often seeks to downplay the distinctiveness
of ethnomethodology’s theoretical resources, perspectives, and objectives in favor
of a radically empiricist observational science (cf. Berard 2005; Pollner 1991; Sche-
gloff 1999). Contrary, then, to Bourdieu’s effort to reflexively purify sociological
theory of common sense biases, or what he called “doxa,” many ethnomethod-
ologists have seemed to adopt what Garfinkel and Sacks (1970:345–46) called
an “ethnomethodological indifference” to sociological theory, suggesting, at least
implicitly, that we might simply allow the empirical social world to reveal itself
directly, unmediated by our own theoretical resources, interests, and objectives.
Abjuring self-conscious regard to one’s own theoretical resources as such, concern
shifted to treating all forms of knowledge only and exclusively as topics of empirical
investigation (Pollner 1991). Writing from ethnomethodology’s, in many ways,
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kindred tradition of conversation analysis, Emanuel Schegloff (1999:581–82), for
example, writes,
In writing that “‘mere description’ is not viable in ordinary discourse,” I meant
precisely to imply a contrast with disciplined empirical inquiry, in which it is viable,
or can be. It is, to be sure, true that the “indefinitely expandable set of noticings” is
a generic characteristic of the world addressed by disciplined naturalistic inquiry,
but its import is not the same there as it is in ordinary discourse. In ordinary dis-
course, “correctness” by itself is not adequate grounds for noticing. In research
inquiry, it is. That is what makes such inquiry a distinctive domain of activity.
“Mere description” is exactly what basic inquiry aims for—to the recurrent cha-
grin of those who insist on its practical relevance or payoff.
But to argue that what Schegloff here calls “disciplined naturalistic inquiry” can
be categorically distinguished from “ordinary discourse” reifies generic, essentialist,
and empirically empty definitional contrasts between scientific research and mun-
dane practice and, indeed, pure and applied science. This systematically blinds us
to the vast diversity of ways in which disciplined naturalistic inquiry, including eth-
nomethodological inquiry, is both embedded in and accomplished through broader
social arrangements that both influence and are influenced by it (Dennis 2019;
Jasanoff 2011; Longino 2002; Ostermann and Kitzinger 2012; Rouse 2002). When
the ethnomethodologist Tim Berard (2005:7) writes of “disinterested description”
as “a variety of description which is not politically or morally driven, but rather
driven by scholarly concerns, according to which social inquiry should be governed
by principles of empiricism and logic rather than ideology” he also performs just
such a reification. But as Lena Jayyusi (1991:247) writes, “Just as one cannot get out
of language to talk about language … so one cannot get out of the moral order in
order to talk about the moral order. What does this mean for the analyst? It means
that she/he uses her/his moral membership, her/his knowledge of the mundane
organization of the practico-moral order as a resource, even as she/he turns it into a
topic.” Contra Schegloff above, Ostermann and Kitzinger (2012) also convincingly
argue the growth of conversation analysis has produced a proliferation of topics and
debates that do not readily yield to the distinction between science and ordinary
discourse, or pure and applied science. Instead these debates and/or practical agen-
das are often demonstrably comprised of a mélange of objectives simultaneously
scientific, political, cultural, medical, and otherwise.
In short, the advocacy of “mere description” mistakenly presumes access to
a value free Archimedean observational standpoint (cf. Daston 2008) and what
John Dewey called a spectator theory of knowledge that dramatically distorts the
empirical realities of knowledge production. Moreover, as will be further argued
below, it is also methodologically confining insofar as it systematically elides from
our attention: (1) the contingent influences history has exerted on the specific topics,
or ontological structures and processes, we investigate such that they appear suffi-
ciently identifiable and enduring to sustain systematic empirical investigation, and
(2) the contingent influences history has exerted on the specific analytic resources
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and practices through which we ourselves seek to study the world. While attending
to these influences will certainly fail to provide Bourdieu’s “eternally and univer-
sally valid” truths, it will provide indispensable materials with which to formulate
particular (and empirically grounded) rather than universal (and empirically empty)
distinctions, and demonstrations of contact points, between our own objectives, per-
spectives, and topics as sociologists and those of our research subjects. And, as I will
show, by thereby allowing us to dissolve the abstract, universalistic, and empirically
vacuous categorical antinomy between biomedical and sociological epistemologies
and ontologies such attention can also significantly reduce the reigning ambiguity
and analytic ambivalence among medical sociologists concerning the epistemology
and ontology of disease.
THE EPISTEMOLOGY AND ONTOLOGY OF DISEASE
IN MEDICAL SOCIOLOGY
As noted earlier, until the late twentieth century sociologists assumed they were
unqualified to study the epistemology and ontology of disease. Instead of focusing on
disease itself, medical sociologists predicated much of their work on the distinction
between disease and illness (Conrad and Barker 2010; Eisenberg 1977). This distinc-
tion relied for its original sense on an a priori metaphysical resolution to divide the
world into two mutually exclusive and pre-given ontological wholes—nature and
culture. The ontology of disease was assigned to the natural side of this partition,
and was understood as an objective, mind-independent, and culturally invariant real-
ity discoverable by natural scientific methods. Conversely, illness was the subjective
experience of disease which was, of course, colored by the idiosyncratic and evolving
interpretive resources and social structural contexts through which all non-scientific
human contact with nature is mediated. Subject, as it was, to the vicissitudes of history
and interaction, illness fell within the province of the social sciences.
Since the groundbreaking research of pioneers like Anselm Strauss and Barney
Glaser (1975), the illness experience perspective has become a mainstay of medical
sociology (cf. Charmaz 1993; Conrad 1987; Pierret 2003; Rier 2010). While prolif-
erating new sociological (as opposed to biomedical) topics, the illness experience
literature has not uniformly abandoned reliance on biomedical knowledge as a pool
of theoretical resources for the conduct of these analyses. Hence, for example, the
essays in Strauss and Glaser (1975) tended to address the distinctive burdens imposed
by biomedically specified disease conditions including rheumatoid arthritis, ulcera-
tive colitis, diabetes, emphysema, and renal failure. Likewise the essays in Anderson
and Bury (1988) consider biomedically specified conditions including multiple scle-
rosis, Parkinson’s disease, arthritis, and others. And as Pierret (2003:5) notes in her
review of the literature, the “huge majority of these publications report on the expe-
rience of a specific illness: epilepsy, Alzheimer’s, rheumatism, polio, heart disease,
cancer, HIV-infection, etc.” These studies do not normally treat as topics the gene-
sis of these diagnostic categories as members’ concepts (or members’ uses of them),
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but instead uncritically adopt these members’ categories as resources with which to
denote biological (i.e., ontological) causes of what Bury (cf. 1982) has called “bio-
graphical disruption.” But as ethnomethodology has long highlighted, the conflation
of members’ (diagnostic) categories with ontological causes of (illness) experiences
masks the fact that these categories are abstract typifications, the production and
application of which are invariably situation specific practical accomplishments (cf.
Maynard and Turowetz 2019; Rosenberg 2002).
That said, some of the illness experience literature has fruitfully addressed the
topic of members’ uses of diagnostic categories as resources by showing the uncer-
tainties, complications, limitations, and distortions that arise in applying these cat-
egories to the unique problems of particular individuals. Bury (1982), for example,
described people’s tendency to entertain a range of medical and nonmedical hypothe-
ses regarding the source(s) of their problems before seeking medical help. And even
after enlisting medical help, unequivocal diagnoses are often elusive. In their classic
study of epilepsy experiences, Schneider and Conrad (1983:60) write,
A seizure disorder like epilepsy is not a clear-cut disease with uniform signs and
symptoms. The diagnosis is the product of clinical medical judgment … At times,
doctors have difficulty making a diagnosis or finding a satisfactory treatment, so
they try different hypotheses and solutions.
Moving beyond the illness experience, Renee Fox (cf. 2000) elevated the topic of
uncertainty by demonstrating its ubiquity throughout modern biomedical practice.
She and others have contributed to a picture of rampant over-compensation for med-
ical uncertainty rising into the hubris of hyper-certainty. Donald Light (1979:320),
for example, argued that medical “professionals run the danger of gaining too much
control over the uncertainties of their work by becoming insensitive to complexities
in diagnosis, treatment, and client relations” (see also Katz 1984:165–206; Timmer-
mans and Berg 2003). Relatedly, Nicholas Christakis (1999:4) explained physicians’
widespread tendency to avoid prognoses as “partly a consequence of the contempo-
rary dominance of an ontological view of disease—a view in which disease is seen as
generic and generally independent of its expression in an individual … Once a diag-
nosis is made and effective therapy initiated, the clinical course of a disease is often
presumed to be relatively fixed—the same for everyone.” By this view, distinguishing
prognosis from diagnosis and therapy only erodes that faith, thereby reintroducing
clinical uncertainty. The medical uncertainty literature ubiquitously reveals a ram-
pant reluctance among clinicians to critically consider the epistemological fallibility
of biomedicine’s conceptual and clinical resources or the ambiguity, contingency, and
particularity of the ontological topics to which they are applied.
In an important step forward in the medical uncertainty literature, Paul Atkin-
son (1995:117) highlighted the inconsistency of uncertainty itself:
… It is vital that we be sensitive to contexts and local variations in examining the
expression of uncertainty … It is not enough to account for these things in terms
of generic and pervasive features of medical culture. There is a need for detailed
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examination of how medical practitioners, students, scientists and others express
and discuss their information, how they voice their opinion, and how they claim
particular warrants for the knowledge and interpretations they endorse.
Atkinson’s insights here dovetail with a broad range of research that demonstrates
how biomedical practice is a heterogeneous and widely distributed set of activi-
ties conducted under discontinuous institutional circumstances (cf. Fujimura 1992;
Gubrium 1986; Haraway 1991; Mol 2002). These institutionally contingent activities
are not necessarily congruent, but may be antagonistic, or, more commonly, simply
mutually irrelevant. Since the late twentieth century we have also witnessed a
growing respect for knowledge produced outside the confines of the “biomedical
model.” Beyond alternative medicines, patients are increasingly organizing into
support groups that often provide therapeutic services themselves (cf. Brown and
Zavestoski 2005). While some of these groups avoid trespassing on the traditionally
biomedical province of disease diagnosis, many do not (cf. Weinberg 2005, 2013).
These developments are putting increasing pressure on social researchers to forsake
the image of the sovereign biomedical diagnostician unearthing the bedrock of
invariant ontological structures and processes underlying our various forms of
unwellness and to appreciate the diversity, evolution, and proliferation of both
biomedical and other sorts of diagnostic systems and categories (Jutel 2009, 2011;
Nissen and Risor 2018; Smith-Morris 2016). Most of this research focuses on the
local epistemological warrants for health related knowledge rather than the ontology
of disease as such. However, because it highlights the contingency, discontinuity,
provisionality, and uncertainty of such knowledge, this work presents an at least
implicit provocation to reconsider the orthodox biomedical ontology of disease.
Defending a critical realist approach, Simon Williams (2003:52) has properly
insisted that “what we know and how we know it (epistemology) … should not be
confused with what there is to know (ontology),” and “[d]isease labels, one might
say, describe but do not constitute disease.” Williams is certainly correct to distinguish
disease categories as conceptual resources from the topics—ontological sources of
suffering and disability—to which they are applied. Unfortunately, however, his
critical realist construal of this distinction completely severs them from one another
and—in line with Kant’s classic discussion of the “thing in itself”—ultimately ren-
ders the ontologically “real” epistemologically unknowable. For Williams, medical
topics (the ontologically real sources of suffering and disability) are comprised of
“intransitive objects … which exist and act independently” of our knowledge of
them (Williams 1999:808). Like other critical realists, he is careful enough to allow
that the putative “properties and powers” of these unknown but real objects (they
must be putative because, by definition, they exist and act independently of any
actual knowledge of them) are only “relatively enduring.” This frees “critical realism
from the charge of over-determinism in which structures can never be changed”
(1999:808). Regrettably, though, such generic philosophical postulates provide us no
information about: (1) the properties and powers of specific real objects (diseases
or otherwise); (2) which real objects are causally active in any given domain of
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empirical research; (3) how enduring or ephemeral specific objects are; or, (4) which
objects should be understood as elemental and which compounds of more elemental
objects. In short, they provide no conceptual resources of any epistemological value
to any particular, or actual, scientific investigation of particular medical topics.
Moreover, Williams (1999:814) is not content to philosophically posit the funda-
mental ontological properties and powers (e.g., the essential intransitivity and trans-
factuality) of real objects without empirical evidence. He wants also to philosoph-
ically assign these imagined and empirically elusive objects to mutually exclusive
sets such that “the biological” and “the social” might be categorically distinguished
not just as conceptual resources with which particular scientific topics might be pro-
ductively framed, but as “real ontological strata,” indeed, irreducible ontological
wholes (Williams 1999:814).3 Perhaps most problematic for present purposes is the
notion that diseases, if they are ontologically real, must exist entirely independently
of knowledge and perception. This position is starkly incompatible with the increas-
ingly undeniable assertion that disease categories are intrinsically value-laden in the
sense that they denote ontological referents that invariably cause harm (cf. Ereshef-
ski 2009; Murphy 2009; Wakefield 1992). Ontologically speaking, it is plainly uncon-
troversial to argue that harmful agents exist. How one might speak of harms as cultur-
ally invariant, value-neutral features of a mind-independent reality is quite another
matter—a matter about which critical realists have remained conspicuously silent.
We are instead simply instructed to uncritically take biomedicine’s current formula-
tions of disease at face value as valid renderings of the enduring ontological realities
they purport to represent.
Williams is by no means alone in his efforts to foster a greater deference to
biomedical knowledge in medical sociology (Williams 2006). For example, though
coming from a very different social theoretical vantage point, Timmermans and
Haas’ (2008) charter for a sociology of disease also calls for a greater and less
critical deference to biomedical knowledge. These essays present two of the most
eloquent voices in a much larger chorus in medical sociology that criticizes social
constructionism for a social reductionism that discounts the reality of disease and
disability (cf. Bury 1986; Shakespeare 2006; Turner 2004). This literature is quite
properly critical of a radical social reductionism that renders diseases as wholly
sociogenic—indeed, as mere labels, myths, discourses, narratives, or roles. Unfor-
tunately, though, it systematically omits consideration of the core challenge social
constructionism raises—that of reconciling claims that diseases are historically
invariant and universal biological realities with the manifestly multiple, evolving,
contingent, and sometimes conflicting standards that govern the objective empirical
identification and management of diseases in actual biomedical practice (Tim-
mermans and Berg 2003). It thereby overlooks the fundamental and indisputable
scientific facts that: (1) the biological regard for diseases is heterogeneous and
evolving, and (2) biomedicine does not possess a monopoly on the epistemology
and ontology of disease (e.g., Aryuvedic Medicine, Traditional Chinese Medicine).
Moreover, it also neglects the more specific questions of how various scientific and
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non-scientific cohorts collectively assess the credibility of ontological claims—that
is, the local relationships people draw between the epistemology and ontology of
disease across diverse cultural and institutional contexts. In the next section, taking
my cues from the enduring ethnomethodological interests in precisely such topics
and Ludwik Fleck’s seminal work in the sociology of biomedical science, I argue
that the collectively orchestrated perceptual habits constitutive of what Garfinkel
once called the natural attitude, rather than mind-independent realities, provide
these cohorts with the ontological topics to which their various conceptual resources
are applied. Using Pierre Bourdieu’s profoundly influential concept of habitus to
demonstrate the pitfalls of radically reductionist sociological explanations of our
perceptual habits, I suggest a way forward in the Fleck inspired observation that per-
ceptual habits are objectively found across diverse cohorts to have been influenced
by a wide range of both social and other (including biological) forms of empirically
identified structure (cf. Latour 2004).
Symptomatic of medical sociology’s enduring ambivalence as to the epistemol-
ogy and ontology of disease, both Williams and Timmermans and Haas discuss
Annemarie Mol’s modern classic, The Body Multiple, in largely approving terms
while at the same time making biomedically reductionist statements starkly incom-
patible with Mol’s core thesis that the ontology of disease is a feature rather than
a mind-independent cause or parameter of socially contingent forms of shared
practice.4 In both cases, otherwise discerning commentaries are compromised by
an over-simplification of the diverse relationships that obtain between sociological
and biomedical epistemologies and ontologies of disease that unnecessarily renders
them mutually exclusive and incommensurable. Winner of both the 2004 Sociology
of Health and Illness Book Prize and Ludwik Fleck Award, The Body Multiple
was described by Arthur Frank (2003:532) in his American Journal of Sociology
review as “my nominee for defining medical sociology in the 21st century.” Mol
targets what she argues is the anachronistic distinction between disease as socially
invariant objective reality and illness as socially variable subjective experience by
contrasting how two forms of medical practice enact what is ostensibly one disease
in very different ways. By closely attending to the practices by which clinicians and
pathologists enact atherosclerosis, she demonstrates that indeed they are working
not only with different epistemological frames or practical agendas but with different
ontological things. As she (2002:35) writes,
The practices of enacting clinical atherosclerosis and pathological atherosclero-
sis exclude one another. The first requires a patient who complains about pain in
his legs. And the second requires a cross section of an artery visible under the
microscope. These exigencies are incompatible, at least: they cannot be realized
simultaneously. This is not a question of words that prove difficult to translate from
one department to the other. Surgeons and pathologists who talk with one another
tend to understand each other very well. It is not a question of looking from dif-
ferent perspectives either. Surgeons know how to look through microscopes and
pathologists have learned to speak with living patients. The incompatibility is a
practical matter.
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However, despite their differences, Mol deftly demonstrates how clinicians and
pathologists practically link their respective work objects through situated collabora-
tions with one another. Clinical findings of atherosclerosis are sometimes confirmed
in the pathology lab and vice versa, but not always. The real world is messier than
that. Attending to the details of medical practice rather than the abstractions of
medical knowledge, Mol shows that practitioners inhabit not a universe—a unified
domain of objects behaving together as a singular system—but a multiverse com-
prised of both familiar and unfamiliar objects that often resist subsumption into a
singular system of knowledge. Moreover, even when we succeed in securing it, medi-
cal knowledge is itself inevitably subject to anomalous findings, revision, and outright
falsification. The ontologically real, for Mol, is very obviously distinct from episte-
mology but, pace critical realism, is neither imperceptible nor equated with abstract
and empirically empty philosophical generalizations. Mol convincingly articulates a
dynamic middle road between the a priori ontologies of biological and social real-
ism. Neither biological nor social structures are cast as mind-independent realities
lying beneath people’s subjective experiences and practices. Instead, both their real-
ity and causal relevance are cast as intrinsically emergent in and through hospital
practices.
While Mol’s contributions are undoubtably profoundly important, there do
remain issues pertaining to her analysis that merit further attention. The first to
consider is the uncontested status of atherosclerosis in her study as an empiri-
cally identifiable medical phenomenon. As Malcolm Ashmore (2005:829) notes,
“Atherosclerosis is neither novel nor uncertain. Nothing in Mol’s ethnography
suggests that its reality and truth are anywhere contested … This then is Mol’s
major contribution: to show that the assumption of stability … in ‘finished sci-
ence’ is inappropriate … the epistemic labour of coordination, distribution and
inclusion continues.” Yet, however, the absence from Mol’s narrative of the specific
history that yielded the “finished science” of atherosclerosis leaves unexplained how
clinicians and pathologists acquired the resources with which they now forge and
provisionally stabilize bodies multiple in practice and how the use of these resources
became comparatively routinized. Absent a social historical explanation, orthodox
biological realists may be all too prone to insist these resources were somehow
furnished by the inevitably stable and putatively mind-independent biological
body singular. Williams (2006:21–2), for example, doubts whether Mol’s analysis
sufficiently provides for how “the body and disease ‘hang together’ or ‘cohere’
through practice” and asks “Does Mol’s emphasis on the enacted nature of reality
in practice … leave adequate room … for the abiding nature of reality between or
over and above any such practices?” An historical genealogy of her ethnographic
research settings could fortify Mol’s argument against devoted biological realists like
Williams by empirically demonstrating specifically how the reality of atherosclerosis
was historically rendered a matter of medical consensus through emergent social
practice rather than by an historically invariant and putatively mind-independent
biological body singular.
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Second, much like Schegloff’s aspiration to “mere description” above, throughout
The Body Multiple and elsewhere Mol seems to suggest the analyst can delegate all
of the ontological work to her research subjects and, it follows, produce an empirical
study without any distinctive ontological commitments of its own. As she explains,
“the attempt of [The Body Multiple] was to shift the doing of ontologies from me
… to the practices that formed my object of research, hospital practices” (Wool-
gar et al. 2008:6). Treating diagnosis as an ethnographic topic rather than resource,
she abjures any invocation of a singular biological atherosclerosis underlying the
myriad practices through which it is variously enacted. On the other hand, and this
must be fully appreciated, Mol also asserts her own positive ontological claim that
“atherosclerosis is more than one but less than many” (Mol 2002:55). Quite obvi-
ously, this is an ethnographically informed claim about what the disease really is that
is not identical with any particular instance of its practical enactment in the hospital
and, for that matter, with which her research subjects in the hospital might very well
disagree.5
By going beyond treating the diagnosis “atherosclerosis” only as a topic—a con-
cept used by her research subjects to identify particular clinical and pathological
work objects—to treating it as a resource—a concept she herself uses to identify
a general or recurrent ethnographic work object that is more than one but less than
many—Mol appears to depart from her claim to have “shift[ed] the doing of ontolo-
gies from me … the analyst … to the practices that formed my object of research,
hospital practices” (Woolgar et al. 2008:6). Mol puts a conceptual resource members
routinely make meaningful exclusively through hospital practices to novel philo-
sophical and social scientific uses. Because she cannot have done otherwise without
becoming a clinician or pathologist, this is by no means a flaw in her analysis. But by
glossing over this transition from medical usages as topics to a social scientific usage
of the diagnostic category as an analytic resource of her own, she camouflages her
own distinctive ontological construal of atherosclerosis as no more than a transparent
representation of members’ practices, encouraging, as did Schegloff in his advocacy
of “mere description,” a positivist erasure of herself as analyst.6 By refraining from
more explicitly distinguishing her own ontological claims and interests from those
of members, Mol also runs the risk of depreciating the importance of investigating
the distinctive socio-historical processes that institutionalized not only the particu-
lar differences and potential meeting points between clinical and lab practices but
those that institutionalized the particular differences and potential meeting points
between her own ethnographic ontological work and the ontological work of those
she studied in the lab and clinic.
A PROPOSAL FOR MOVING FORWARD
What is needed to move forward in debates concerning the epistemology and ontol-
ogy of disease in medical sociology, then, is an approach that avoids radically isolat-
ing them from one another by an untraversable metaphysical chasm (as do critical
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realists like Williams) but does not conflate ontological topics and epistemological
resources by means of positivist presumptions to “mere description.” Following the
philosopher of science Willard van Orman Quine, we must relinquish the idea that
philosophical generalizations of the sort produced by critical realists might somehow
legitimate or steer science from a position external to it (cf. Rouse 2002). Philoso-
phy simply does not occupy an Archimedean standpoint from which to posit either
universal ontological structures or universal epistemological standards for the legit-
imation of knowledge. But neither is there an Archimedean standpoint from which
one might engage in the kind of “mere description” advocated by Schegloff and,
seemingly, Mol. As Garfinkel taught long ago, we have, then, no alternative to intrin-
sically provisional substantive analyses of the emergent processes through which our
theoretical resources and the ontological topics to which they are applied are practi-
cally realized (that is, provisionally made real) and related to one another both among
those we study and among ourselves as analysts.
Beyond ethnomethodologically embracing the intrinsically practical and situated
provisionality of epistemological resources and ontological topics in this way we must
also more emphatically topicalize the perceptual habits Garfinkel held constitutive
of the natural attitude in place of the metaphysical chasm that Kantians, including
critical realists, have posited between a putatively mind-independent objective real-
ity and subjective, including scientific, perception and agency. Habit indispensably
furnishes a pre-theoretical empirical world of perceptible ontological topics irre-
ducible to the analytic resources we use to account for them. It is therefore prospec-
tively useful to discursive knowledge production in a way that a mind-independent
world, because it is imperceptible, can never be.7 As the acclaimed historian of sci-
ence Lorraine Daston (2008:99) has argued, “It is habit that makes perception of
a world possible … The novice sees only blurs and blobs under the microscope;
experience and training are required in order to make sense of this visual chaos, in
order to be able to see things.” Citing the biologist Ludwik Fleck’s groundbreaking
contributions to our understanding of the ontology of disease, Daston (2008:100)
writes,
For Fleck, learning to see like a scientist was a matter of accumulated
experience—not only of an individual but of a well trained collective. The
fault line in epistemology did not run between subjects and objects, the great
Kantian divide, but, rather, between inexperience and experience. Unlike the
neo-Kantians, who worried about how the subjective mind could know the
objective world, Fleck was concerned with how perception forged stable kinds
out of confused sensations … Another way of putting this contrast is to say that
Fleck was more interested in ontology than in epistemology.8
But to argue for the importance of collectively orchestrated habit formation to an
ontology relevant for scientific research is not yet to articulate a satisfying theoretical
model of such a thing. Pierre Bourdieu is the social theorist who most systematically
expounded the centrality of habit to social life and perception (cf. Bourdieu 1990).
As a sociologist, Bourdieu was always eager to highlight the profound extent to
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which habits, or habitus, embody the specifically social determinants of our lives.
Though there is nothing in his formulation that demands the habitus be construed
as exclusively sociogenic, Bourdieu has been occasionally taken to task for assert-
ing a sociologically reductionist cosmology wherein structural causes of the habitus
that are not social, including putatively biological structural causes, are merely resid-
ual stipulations rather than fully integrated aspects of his analyses (cf. Dreyfus and
Rabinow 1993; Latour 2005; Sismondo 2011).9 While this problem is solvable, its
solution requires a softening of Bourdieu’s methodological insistence that our the-
oretical resources be categorically distinguished from our ontological topics or, as
he put it, that we execute a categorical epistemological “break” between our own
knowledge and that of our research subjects (cf. Bourdieu 1990).
Such a softening would shift Bourdieu’s position considerably closer to so-called
post-humanists like Donna Haraway, Karin Knorr-Cetina, Bruno Latour, and
Annemarie Mol. Like Fleck, these researchers favor a more porous sociology
wherein we might sometimes treat our research subjects’ practices and perceptions,
including their discursive testimony, not only as topics for reductive sociological
explanation (e.g., as invariably symptomatic of their locations in Bourdieuian social
fields which they themselves inevitably misrecognize10) but as provisionally epis-
temologically legitimate, or provisionally valid, theoretical resources in their own
right. This would allow for the possibility that people’s activities and experiences
are sometimes caused not only by their interactions with structures or mechanisms
identified by Bourdieuian sociologists but with structures or mechanisms identified
by pathologists, clinicians, biologists, psychologists, lay actors, and others. It was
Bourdieu’s vigorous opposition to such a porous sociology that Lynch (2000:31)
described as a source of “conflict when applied to practices that do not regard
themselves as naïve.” Sadly, Bourdieu is not alone in promoting this kind of rad-
ically sociologically reductionist approach. Among other liabilities, this approach
decisively precludes even the most provisional and circumscribed reconciliations (or
fruitful disagreements) between sociological and alternative (including biomedical)
epistemologies and ontologies of disease.
The medical sociology of disease is now too often seemingly stuck between the
Scylla and Charybdis of a priori sociological and biological reductionisms. One must
either, it seems, with Bourdieu, explain biomedical practices, including the biomed-
ical identification and engagement with disease, with exclusively socio-historical
rather than biomedical, or any other presumably asocial, theoretical resources; or,
like the critical realists, reify biomedical topics by philosophically projecting them
into a putative ontological domain beyond the scope of empirical evidence, knowl-
edge, and social history. We are thereby forced to choose between two equally valid
scientific claims: (1) the sociological claim that disease categories are conceptual
resources devised and applied in accord with culturally specific and socially evolving
standards and training and (2) the biomedical claim that the topics—ontological
structures and processes—empirically denoted with these categories are often
manifestly asocial rather than social causes of suffering and disability. We need to
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accommodate both. Second, but equally perniciously, by philosophically predefining
biology and society (or “layers” within them) as mind-independent and mutually
exclusive “ontological strata” we deprive scientists, clinicians, and other prospective
experts of the authority to specify and revise their inevitably provisional regard for
the empirically objective nature of these domains, the objects that populate them,
and the sorts of relationships that might be discovered between them (Benton 1991;
Rouse 2002). This a priori conceptual deadlock has long thwarted progress in the
medical sociology of disease.
Let me now finish this section with a brief empirical case study of how to transcend
the conceptual deadlock between a priori biological and sociological reductionisms.
Consider the following ethnographic data excerpt drawn from fieldwork I conducted
in a therapeutic community for people dually diagnosed with an addiction and major
mental illness (cf. Weinberg 2005). For a variety of reasons, residents of this thera-
peutic community were often found to both feign and conceal ill health. Given the
ever-present possibility that people were dissembling, prima facie evidence of health
and pathology was never taken completely for granted. This excerpt is taken from
a staff meeting wherein the authenticity of a particular resident’s recent epileptic
seizures is discussed.11 Jane, a counselor, asked,
“What are we going to do with Ruby?” There were a lot of frowns and shak-
ing heads following this question. Eve, another counselor, replied, “I don’t know.
What can we do is the question.”
Jane asked, “Are we gonna have to let her go?”
Eve answered, “I think we might have to. This program is just not equipped to deal
with someone with her kinds of problems. Apparently she had another seizure last
night … ”
John, another counselor, asked, “What about those seizures? What do you think
those are about?” There was more shaking of heads then John followed up on his
own question, “I mean do we know for sure if they’re even real?”
Jane said, “Yeah, some of the residents said they thought she was faking them
… ”
Eve said, “Really? Why would she do that?
John said, “Who knows? It could be anything … ”
Eve asked, “Why did the residents think she was faking?”
Jane answered, “I think you can more or less tell with seizures if they’re real or not.
Tracy (a resident) said her eyes rolled back in her head and she started to shake
slowly and then it got worse. But she, like, got down on her side and started shak-
ing around and then got up looking all disoriented.” Jane gave a look suggesting
she thought it could be an act.
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John said, “I think they might be fake. I mean she’s had like two or three since
she got here. That’s a bit much I think.”
This conversation begins with pessimistic reflections on the social model program’s
clinical limitations in the face of Ruby’s evident neurological affliction and the possi-
ble conclusion that they may need to refer her to a more appropriate clinical caregiver
more medically equipped to deal with “her kinds of problems.” The exchange is
clearly focused on the ontological topic of Ruby’s evident seizures as empirically fur-
nished by members’ common sense perceptions (rather than the mind independent
reality) of Ruby’s behavior. However, as the conversation proceeds, these common
sense observations are subject to a more rigorous analysis via a set of members’
competencies informed simultaneously by conceptual resources drawn from (1) gen-
eral biomedically informed orientations to how epilepsy typically presents both in
terms of its behavioral qualities (“eyes rolled back in her head,” “shaking,” “disori-
ented”) and its episodic quantity (“she’s had like two or three since she got here.
That’s a bit much I think.”) and (2) general sociologically informed orientations to
practical action as typically based on reasons (“Why would she do that?” “Why did
the residents think she was faking?”). This discussion, then, exhibits a hybrid tran-
scendence of a priori biological and sociological reductionisms. The discussion of
whether Ruby’s seizures were “real” or “fake” was precisely a discussion of whether
the ontological status of Ruby’s evident seizures was biological or sociological. And,
as can be seen, this discussion was intrinsically provisional and based in the first
instance on the empirical evidence provided by habituated, practically embedded,
perception.
Moving on from members’ own practices of transcending a priori reductionisms,
let us consider the methodological upshot of ethnographic materials like these for
our own possibilities as sociologists to transcend the antinomy between sociolog-
ical and biological reductionisms. As has been noted, were we to take Bourdieu’s
notion of a decisive epistemological break seriously, we would seek to analyze
this discussion through the purely sociological prism provided by the conceptual
triad of habitus, field, and capital. The debate over the ontological status of Ruby’s
putative seizures would be explained in terms of the various forms of capital at
work in this particular field, and the specific sorts of investments these actors had
come to dispositionally embody in the form of their habitus. It is these, and only
these, that an orthodox Bourdieuian would say give empirical form to the topics and
resources members bring to the discussion. By these lights, only social structures
appear in our explanation. The debate over the ontological reality of Ruby’s seizures
is thereby reduced to a clash of invariably sociogenic schemata of perception and
appreciation.
But as Williams (2006:9) quite properly complains, radical forms of sociological
reductionism like Bourdieu’s cannot provide for the myriad ways our specifically
biological “[b]odies surprise us, … betray us in all sorts of ways that render our
constructions of them problematic.” For Williams the body, then, is not only Bour-
dieu’s sociologically identifiable site for the incorporation of historically specific
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forms of capital. It is also the biologically identifiable site of pathology, dysfunc-
tion, and death. More specifically, Williams insists bodily surprises reveal how the
mind-independent ontological domain he identifies as the biological intrudes upon,
constrains and, indeed, structures the processes Bourdieu would have us understand
as entirely sociogenic. While I very much agree that biology does, on occasion,
furnish scientifically and/or clinically satisfying explanations for such surprises (like
seizures), I hesitate to endorse the proposal that it does so without exception. Do
not bodies sometimes also surprise biologists? And, I might ask, does not sociol-
ogy sometimes furnish scientifically and/or clinically satisfying explanations of the
bodies that surprise biologists? Given that those informed by both sociological and
biological conceptual resources seem to be in the same boat when it comes to bodily
surprises, I am reluctant to endorse Williams’ ontological equation of the surprising
body with the biological body. As is suggested by the ethnographic data excerpt
above, which conceptual resources—biological, sociological, or otherwise—best
explain the bodily surprises, or what Bury called biographical disruptions, that
variously arise in our lives is a question best answered not categorically and in
the abstract but provisionally and with respect to the available evidence in any
given case.
Building upon these points, another important research method that can be used
to transcend biological and sociological reductionisms is reflexivity. Not only are
our research endeavors guided by evidence alone, as positivists would have it. They
are also guided by the particular mix of scientific, clinical, policy, cultural, political,
economic, and other questions we seek to answer in any given project. Empirically
informed reflexive dialogue hones our research skills by facilitating a more explicit
regard for the specific nature of our shared work in all of its myriad forms and the dis-
tinctive resources and constraints that attend the specific conditions under which it is
accomplished. This type of exercise systematically moves us beyond the confines of
various axiomatic, or a priori, theoretical preconceptions and facilitates a much more
nuanced and contingent understanding of what, in any given instance, our research
objectives actually are. These might often include interdisciplinary collaborations
wherein contingent discussions like the one above regarding the nature of Ruby’s
seizures are undertaken not only by our research subjects but among ourselves as
analysts and all of those with whom we collaborate. Contra Bourdieu’s categorical
epistemological break, ethnographers have grown increasingly appreciative of the
fact that practitioners of other research traditions and, indeed, our research subjects
themselves often have a great deal to teach us. In particular, they often have much
to teach us about the various types and sources of biographical disruption we all are
prone to sometimes suffer.
The prospective fruitfulness of linking different research projects or facilitating
dialogue across disciplinary boundaries is never a foregone conclusion. But contrary
to sociological and biological reductionisms, such dialogue is plainly possible even
in the absence of shared axiomatic foundations and often does prove fruitful in
many different and sometimes unanticipated ways. Far less fruitful than examining
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the prospective benefits of interdisciplinary dialogue in any particular instance,
though, is the wholly speculative task of imagining the foundational relation-
ship(s) that might universally hold between biology and society construed as if
they were somehow wholly distinct, pre-given and internally integrated ontological
wholes.
CONCLUSION
This article began by noting medical sociologists have long struggled with whether
to be accomplices or critics of biomedicine. This struggle has often been cast as a
choice between endorsing and critiquing the validity of biomedicine’s diagnostic
terms of reference. I do not mean to suggest this choice has had to be all-inclusive
or indiscriminate. One can, of course, endorse some biomedical terms of reference
and critique others. However, our capacity for epistemologically justifying such
nuance and situated discretion has been unnecessarily undermined by an enduring
and entrenched ontological antinomy between biomedically and sociologically
reductionist realisms. Medical sociology has too often remained confined by the
mistaken reification of the adjectives “social” and “biological” into categorically
separate “ontological strata.” Rather than regarding these adjectives as epistemic
resources the usage and ontological referents of which are forged and historically
evolve within myriad discontinuous practical contexts, we have too often encum-
bered our investigations with the unwarranted presupposition that these terms
are anchored in enduring, mutually exclusive, and mind-independent ontological
domains.
I have argued that replacing this a priori, abstract, monolithic, and empirically
unsubstantiated imagery with that of situationally embedded epistemological
resources and locally perceptually available ontological topics is a useful step
forward (see also Dennis 2019). By reminding us that both epistemological and
ontological questions are raised and addressed for local reasons with local the-
oretical repertoires and in accord with local standards of value, the language of
topic and resource effectively deflates and replaces abstract metaphysical specu-
lation with empirically grounded scientific dialogue and debate. The topics that
concern different scientific communities are thereby respecified not as ontologically
obdurate and timeless sources of incommensurability and disciplinary isolation
but as amenable to modification, cross-disciplinary collaboration, and mutually
constructive dialogue and critique. In short, we replace the hopelessly abstract
and unanswerable question of biology’s generic relations to society or culture
with more precise and far more pressing questions concerning the respective
capacities of particular social, biomedical, and interdisciplinary research cohorts
to effectively address the particular clinical, policy, scientific, cultural, political,
economic, and other challenges that empirically demonstrably arise in our often
common worlds.
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NOTES
1. Garfinkel formulated the natural attitude as the largely habituated, unreflective “background
expectancies” that encourage members to take the myriad realities they inhabit for granted.
His famous breaching experiments were designed precisely to draw out into the light of day the
otherwise tacit and taken for granted, or habituated, features of common sense orientations to
the factual or real. As will be argued later in the article, this understanding of habituated, prac-
tically embedded, perception can be further elaborated with reference to the work of Ludwik
Fleck as an alternative to realist and positivist ontologies that posit a mind-independent reality
beyond perception that only the work of scientific analysis can reveal.
2. One example will suffice to illustrate the basis of the complaint. When surveys require respon-
dents to choose between the common sense categories male and female, they thereby not only
ignore how this binary is variously accomplished in practice, they discourage our even contem-
plating its historicity or reformation.
3. In a later essay Williams (2006:18) qualifies this position by sub-dividing biology into “a com-
plex, multi-layered domain” but because he remains committed to the critical realist defini-
tion of the real as mind-independent, intransitive, and transfactual, this does not obviate the
fundamental problems of bridging the chasm between epistemology and ontology or, assum-
ing they are real, warranting the a priori specification of these “layers” without any empirical
(mind-dependent) knowledge of them.
4. Williams (2006:14–15), for example, promotes a critical realist ontology of disease as
mind-independent in stark contrast to Mol’s ontology of emergent social practice. For
their part, Timmermans and Haas (2008:660, 666) write, “social scientists have become mainly
interested in the experience, culture, and social structuring of illnesses while bracketing the
biological bedrock of disease” and “The idea is here not to regard biomedical pathology as a
determinant of the social experience but as a group of characteristics that set the parameters
of social interaction.” Both of these essays categorically distinguish “the biological bedrock
of disease” from emergent social practice rather than construing it, like Mol, as inseparable
from, and invariably realized only through, social practice. By using nouns like “bedrock” they
also promote a blanket deference to biomedical knowledge as somehow more foundational
than other forms of knowledge. This said, Timmermans has in more recent work exhibited a
more nuanced appreciation of the intrinsic sociality of the ontology of disease that does not
so obviously ontologically bifurcate “the social” from “the biological” (cf. Timmermans 2017;
Timmermans and Buchbinder 2012). I should therefore emphasize that my objective in this
article is not to critique Timmermans’ current views on the ontology of disease but to tex-
tually demonstrate in some of his work and that of many others an enduring and pervasive
ambivalence in the field of medical sociology concerning the epistemology and ontology of
disease.
5. I thank Akbar Ansari for bringing this to my attention.
6. James Laidlaw (2015:184) has noted this tendency is ubiquitous in the Actor–Network litera-
ture. Arguing that causal explanation is not simply a matter of mere description but is instead
accountable to the interests one, and one’s audience, may have in the particulars of one’s causal
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explanation, he writes “Actor–Network Theorists have their own reasons (no doubt not always
the same reasons … ) for emphasizing the significance of non-human entities in explaining par-
ticular states of affairs. The important point, for my purposes here, is just that those interests,
whatever they are, are those theorists’ interests, and not necessarily those of the people … they
describe.”
7. As Daniel Breslau (2000:293) wryly wrote, “It is safe to say that no one has ever observed
an instance of scientific knowledge constrained by an unknowable and meaningless material
world.”
8. Fleck’s attention to the collective orchestration of perceptual habit formation predates
Garfinkel’s inauguration of ethnomethodology but resonates deeply with ethnomethodology’s
attention to the collective orchestration of the tacit, taken for granted, competences constitutive
of what ethnomethodologists call membership. It should also be emphasized that by fore-
grounding members’ regard for one another’s observable competencies rather than the tacit
perceptual habits these observed competencies reveal, neither Fleck nor ethnomethodologists
need to view different members’ tacit competences as identical to one another. While it may
be sensible to endorse Garfinkel’s observation that the intrinsic accountability of practical
action fosters the acquisition and habituation of capacities to competently participate in shared
practices, we need not assume these capacities, or habits, take identical forms (Turner 1994).
These practical and perceptual habits need only to be sufficiently attuned to allow for mean-
ingful collaboration. Disagreement over the ontological character of what we perceive under
microscopes or otherwise remains, despite our differences, a form of meaningful collaboration.
9. Evidence of Bourdieu’s sociological reductionism is not confined to his writings on habitus.
For example, he defines the concept capital exclusively in terms of “accumulated labor” (Bour-
dieu 1986:241). By equating all power with capital (p. 242) and defining capital only in terms of
accumulated labor, Bourdieu omits from his sociological purview any causes of personal ability
and disability other than accumulated labor (e.g., genetic inheritance, trauma and infection, or
any other asocial sources of personal capacity or incapacity).
10. As Dreyfus and Rabinow (1993:42–3) note, Bourdieu’s insistence on “the idea that a specific
illusion is required to make the system work demands that actors can never be right about their
specific motivations.” Analogous problems plague Bloor (1991), Collins and Yearley (1992),
and many other sociologists of science who, like Bourdieu, seek to categorically privilege their
own over all other claims to objectivity.
11. All names are pseudonyms.
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